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I. INTRODUCTION
“AND ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make youfree.”1 This biblical verse, from the Christian New Testa-ment Gospel of John, is etched into the wall of the original
main building of the Central Intelligence Agency, expressing a secular
faith in the altruistic mission of intelligence agencies in a free society.
Thus, the darkest and most secretive of all agencies in modern American
government, the Central Intelligence Agency, draws missionary suste-
nance from a scriptural source.
In this 100th anniversary tribute by the Southern Methodist University
Law Review to the famous opinions of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in
Schenck v. United States2 and Abrams v. United States,3 I seek to explore
* Dean and Professor of Law, Widener University Delaware Law School.
1. See John 8:32.
2. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3. 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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competing conceptions of what Americans might mean by the notion that
the “truth shall make you free.”
The “early Holmes” and the “later Holmes” represent two fundamen-
tally different conceptions of freedom of speech. The astonishing trans-
formation of Holmes occupies a place in the American sacred-secular
space akin to the monumental reversals found in foundational scriptural
texts of the world’s great religions: a conversion as momentous as Jacob
to Abraham or Saul becoming Paul on the road to Damascus. Yet as with
most foundational texts, the opinions of Holmes in Schenck and Abrams,
like the admonitions about truth, faith, and freedom to be found in any
deeply resonant belief system, are filled with contradiction, ambiguity,
and mystery.
Marc Antony came to bury Caesar, not to praise him.4 In this essay I,
at times, come perilously close to secular sacrilege, burying, not praising,
the reputation of Justice Holmes, to the point of unseemly piling on. Yet
unless we fully grasp the early Holmes, we will fail to appreciate the
power of the contrast to the later Holmes. Let me use as an analogy the
“early Nixon” and the “later Nixon.” The early Holmes was as much a
free-speech-hater as the early Richard Nixon was a red-baiter. Yet
de´tente with China may have been achieved because President Richard
Nixon, a fierce anti-communist, chose to go there and make peace. Per-
haps Holmes is to modern First Amendment law what Richard Nixon was
to American diplomacy with the communist Chinese. The free speech
conversion experience of Holmes was as potent and improbable as the
Chinese conversion experience of Nixon. And Holmes, like Nixon, ap-
proached the project with the zeal of a true convert.
The notion that Abrams represented a profound break with prior
American precedent and with the internal psychology of Oliver Wendell
Holmes has often been observed.5 The orthodox narrative is that Schenck
and the early Holmes were bad and that Abrams, and its ultimate tri-
umph decades later, have been good.
In this narrative, I explore a more complicated narrative. The early
Holmes, and the narrow view of free speech that dominated American
law prior to Abrams, in fact has much to commend it. The early Holmes,
the Holmes willing to allow the government to punish speech that we are
certain is evil and can have only a bad tendency to advance that evil,
appeals to “perfectly logical” calculations of the human mind. The logic
of the early Holmes, in my judgment, is largely embraced by many on
modern American university campuses. I use as an example the tragic
confrontations at the University of Virginia and the City of Charlottes-
ville in the summer of 2017 to punctuate this point. It is very difficult,
logically, to see any persuasive reason why the law should tolerate the
4. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2.
5. See, e.g., THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 3
(2013).
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racist and anti-Semitic efforts of the alt-right groups that descended on
Charlottesville to wreak hatred and violence on Charlottesville and the
Virginia campus.
Yet for all that, while it took a long time coming, the “later Holmes”
would eventually supplant the “early Holmes” in formal American First
Amendment doctrine. The Schenck Holmes would continue to have the
upper hand in American precedent well into the 1950s. Not until the
1960s would the libertarian views of the Abrams Holmes take hold as the
dominant genes in the precedential gene pool.
I was personally part of the scholarly and advocacy movement pressing
for that reversal. Yet on the 100th anniversary of this great American
debate, I have personal difficulty pontificating as the cock-sure victor.
The conflict I feel in my own mind and heart over what we mean by
freedom of speech or the notion that the truth shall make us free feel as
raw and ragged to me in 2019 as they must have felt to Holmes in 1919.
Even the celebrated dissent by Holmes in Abrams reveals the split. One
can almost sense Holmes struggling, arguing with himself.
The struggle continues at the heart of the larger American constitu-
tional unconscious. The early Holmes appeals to our logic. The later
Holmes appeals to our faith. The struggle remains a remarkably even
fight.
II. CHARLOTTESVILLE 2017
Lest we think that one hundred years of history since Schenck and
Abrams is a mere nostalgic tribute to a pivotal turning point in the intel-
lectual history of the American free speech tradition, I begin this essay
with a brief review of the current state of play in American discourse over
the meaning of free speech.
Most revealing is the highly contested debate over the appropriate
meaning of freedom of speech currently extant on American college cam-
puses. Confrontations over the meaning of freedom of speech have been
highly visible on many American campuses, public and private, large and
small, in recent years. I focus here on just one confrontation, which began
on the University of Virginia campus and then spread throughout the
streets of Charlottesville, as a particularly virulent and deadly exemplar. I
recall the bloody conflict in Charlottesville during the summer of 2017 to
illustrate how the confrontations posed over the meaning of freedom of
speech in Schenck and Abrams remain an ever-vexing conflict in the
American constitutional unconscious. Or as William Faulkner, who
taught as a writer in residence at the University of Virginia, once put it:
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”6
I received a call on the Monday following Labor Day weekend in Sep-
tember 2017 from the Governor’s Office in Richmond, Virginia. The call
came from Shannon Dion, who was working in the Office of Virginia
6. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951).
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Governor Terry McAuliffe. Shannon had been my law student at the Uni-
versity of Richmond School of Law, where I had served as the Dean of
the Law School. She was phoning on behalf of the Governor and Vir-
ginia’s Secretary of Public Safety, Brian Moran. Governor McAuliffe had
created a Governor’s Task Force to study the racial violence in Char-
lottesville, Virginia, during the summer of 2017. That violence had
claimed the life of Heather Heyer, on August 12, 2017, when a white su-
premacist, James Alex Fields, slammed his speeding car pell-mell into a
Charlottesville crowd of counter-protesters confronting a racist “Unite
the Right” rally. Two Virginia State Troopers also died that day when
their helicopter, positioned to monitor the violence in Charlottesville,
crashed during their mission.
Earlier in the summer, I had been asked by the Virginia American Civil
Liberties Union to serve as the First Amendment lawyer representing the
alt-right groups when the City of Charlottesville sought to move their
“Unite the Right” rally away from downtown Charlottesville. I had been
an active litigator in emotionally charged confrontations involving speech
and equality in Virginia, including acting as lead counsel in a famous Su-
preme Court decision challenging Virginia’s anti-cross-burning law, a case
called Virginia v. Black,7 in which my client had been the Ku Klux Klan. I
was co-counsel in a libel suit brought by a fraternity at the University of
Virginia arising from Rolling Stone’s publication of an article alleging a
gang-rape initiation ritual at a University of Virginia fraternity that
turned out to be fabricated. Yet “seeing life from both sides now,”8 I’d
also been active as a university leader railing against hate speech and
sexual assault on American campuses, having served as a President of
Furman University and the dean of three law schools: Richmond, Wash-
ington and Lee, and Delaware. I ended up declining to represent the ra-
cial supremacists in Charlottesville. This left me free to participate in
Governor McAuliffe’s Task Force.
I had watched with horror the television images of racist violence in
Charlottesville the month before. With so much of the nation, I had been
shocked and traumatized by the gruesome video of Fields slamming his
car into the crowd of innocent counter-protesters, murdering Heather
Heyer. I also felt especially personal pangs of guilt, doubt, and remorse
over the violence that engulfed Charlottesville and the death of Heather
Heyer, for I had personally argued the Supreme Court case fighting for
the rights of racist groups like the Ku Klux Klan and American neo-Nazis
to spread their bile on the streets and parks of Virginia. What had my
advocacy wrought? I felt vaguely complicit in the hate speech, violence,
carnage, and death.
7. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). I was lead appellate counsel in Virginia v. Black, responsible
for writing the briefs and presenting oral argument in the Supreme Court. The contrasts
between Schenck and Abrams were a driving force in how I attempted to frame the argu-
ments in the case.
8. JONI MITCHELL, Both Sides Now, on CLOUDS (Reprise Records 1969).
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It was in that spirit that I approached the work of the Charlottesville
Task Force. It was in that spirit that I came to see that the events of
Charlottesville in the super-heated hateful summer of 2017 had meaning
and resonance far beyond that time and place.
Viewed as social history, there are time-tunnel linkages between the
ferment that occupied the nation in the years prior to the 1919 decisions
in Schenck and Abrams and the ferment that has occupied the nation
between 2016 and 2019. Schenck and Abrams arose from prosecutions
against protestors opposed to World War I and opposed more broadly to
the state of American life after the industrial revolution. As the distin-
guished legal historian David Rabban has explained, in the period leading
up to World War I “the consequences of industrialization led to substan-
tial social unrest and radical activity.”9 Many in America responded with
nativist fear to mass immigration, labor unrest, and anarchists.10 “It is not
surprising that this turbulent period tested the legal meaning of free
speech.”11 One hundred years ago, those invoking the protection of free-
dom of speech were on the left, seeking to invoke the First Amendment
in defense of their expression against capitalism, nativism, racism, and
war.
In Charlottesville in 2017, those seeking to invoke the First Amend-
ment in defense of their expression were on the right—or the newly
coined “alt-right”—demanding the shelter of freedom of speech for
messages of racism, anti-Semitism, and nativism.
The long, hot 2017 summer in Charlottesville was also the first summer
of the presidency of Donald Trump and certainly not the winter of his
opponent’s discontent. Many of those who reacted with fear and loathing
at the election of President Trump interpreted his election as a rearguard
yearning for America’s racist and xenophobic past; a yearning for an
America in which “greater” is code for “whiter,” conjuring images of
ethno-state revivals of America in 1924 or Germany in 1933. Alt-right
chants like “you will not replace us” or “blood and soil” were seen as
surrogates for Trump’s subliminal message.12
On June 17, 2015, Dylann Storm Roof, a white supremacist, brutally
murdered nine African Americans at the Emanuel African Methodist
Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. Roof’s evil massacre of
innocents would have ripple effects far beyond Charleston. His actions
renewed debates over guns, the Second Amendment, and the right to
bear arms. His actions also changed the dynamics of American debate
over symbols of the Confederacy, including the Confederate battle flag
and monuments to Confederate leaders such as Jefferson Davis, Stone-




12. Adam Goodheart, Regime Change in Charlottesville, POLITICO (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/16/regime-change-in-charlottesville-2155
00 [https://perma.cc/66YN-Q96E].
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wall Jackson, and Robert E. Lee. The ripple effects reached across the
South, and the nation, and took on special intensity in Charlottesville.
Prior to committing the murders, Roof toured South Carolina histori-
cal sites with links to the Civil War and slavery posting photographs and
selfies of his visits.13 Four of the photographs on Roof’s site showed him
with the Confederate battle flag.
His online narrative, styled as his “manifesto,” was the story of his ra-
cist radicalization. Roof’s rambling manifesto was infested with attacks
on African Americans, Hispanics, and Jews. “I have no choice,” Roof
asserted.14 “I am not in the position to, alone, go into the ghetto and
fight. I chose Charleston because it is most historic city in my state, and at
one time had the highest ratio of blacks to Whites in the country.”15 Roof
portrayed himself as one of the few with the courage to do what it takes.
“We have no skinheads, no real KKK, no one doing anything but talking
on the internet,” he stated.16 “Well someone has to have the bravery to
take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me.”17
The Charleston Massacre led to the violence in Charlottesville. Like so
many other cities in the United States in the aftermath of the Charleston
Massacre, Charlottesville began to re-examine its own prominent symbols
of the Confederacy, including two prominent statues of Robert E. Lee
and Stonewall Jackson. The prospect that Charlottesville might have the
statues removed provided the cover for rallies by alt-right leaders such as
Richard Spencer.18 While on the surface the rallies were over monuments
to Lee and Jackson, on a deeper level the rallies were stalking horses for
larger American debates over race, religion, and immigration. All of
these debates again placed in raised relief the ongoing American debate
over the meaning of freedom of speech. As the great legal philosopher
and New York Yankee catcher Yogi Berra once said, “It was de´ja` vu all
over again.”
The American conflict symbolized by Charlottesville, just like the
American conflict centered during World War I, forced confrontation
over the meaning of free speech. The conflict pits two powerful yet op-
posing impulses. Many at the University of Virginia and the City of Char-
lottesville, and many of their allies on American campuses and
communities across the United States, cannot imagine plausible policy or
13. Michael S. Schmidt, Charleston Suspect Was in Contact with Supremacists, Officials
Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/04/us/dylann-roof-was-in-
contact-with-supremacists-officials-say.html [https://perma.cc/FKQ6-AANJ].
14. Francis Robles, Dylann Roof Photos and a Manifesto Are Posted on Website, N.Y.





18. James Doubek, Richard Spencer Leads Group Protesting Sale of Confederate Stat-
ute, NPR (May 14, 2017, 2:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/14/
528363829/richard-spencer-leads-group-protesting-sale-of-confederate-statue [https://per
ma.cc/Z6WB-6CCD].
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legal arguments supporting protection of the virulent racist, anti-Semitic,
and nationalist messages of the contemporary alt-right. Many opposed to
the radical labor, anti-capitalist, anti-war messages of the World War I
insurgents held fast to identical views on the limits of speech. Yet there
were contrarian voices, then and now, insisting that these feared
messages be allowed the free vent of open expression in the marketplace,
however convinced those in the mainstream might be that those messages
are morally bankrupt and capable of nothing better than a tendency to
promote discord, violence, and death. While the identities of many of the
proponents and opponents of these views may have swapped places—
many on the right have now traded places with many on the left on the
meaning of free speech—the core debate has remained largely un-
changed and largely, in the end, a relatively even fight.
III. EXPLORING THE INNER HOLMES
A. THE GREAT DISSENT
If we take a time machine back to 1919, we can see how these two
opposing impulses raged at large not only in our national social and legal
culture, but also inside the psyche of one of the most extraordinary influ-
encers in the history of our national social and legal culture, Justice Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes.
Holmes’s opinion in Abrams remains, to this day, the most famous and
celebrated opinion articulating this nation’s radical commitment to robust
protection for freedom of speech in our legal history. Holmes’s opinion in
Abrams was a dissent—a loser—but like a select few other prophetically
haunting dissents, including Holmes’s dissent in Lochner v. New York19
or Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,20 the
Holmes dissent in Abrams would come to be revered as an artifact of
secular-sacred legal scripture, a prophetic cry from the wilderness that
would emerge as the accepted truth that would set the nation free.
To say the least, however, Holmes did not start out this way.
B. HOLMES AND THE RIGHT-PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION
The early Holmes, or the Holmes prior to Abrams, was no friend of
civil liberties and no friend of freedom of speech. In McAuliffe v. City of
New Bedford, dating back to his tenure on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, Holmes summarily rejected a suit brought by a New Bed-
ford police officer who had been dismissed by the mayor for violating a
rule stating, “No member of the department shall be allowed to solicit
money or any aid, on any pretense, for any political purpose whatever.”21
Officer McAuliffe argued that his dismissal invaded his “right to express
19. 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20. 163 U.S. 537, 552–64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
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his political opinions.”22 For Holmes, McAuliffe’s claim was an utter non-
starter. In a famous epigram, Holmes wrote, “The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman.”23 For Holmes, the free speech rights of the public em-
ployee, McAuliffe, were waived through the terms of his contract of em-
ployment, in which he agreed to the conditions attached by the city, his
employer. There are “few employments for hire in which the servant does
not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of
idleness by the implied terms of his contract.”24 Just as any employee in
the private sector, McAuliffe “takes the employment on the terms which
are offered him.”25
In another case decided by Holmes while he was still on the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Davis, Holmes af-
firmed the conviction of a preacher for violating a Boston ordinance re-
quiring advance permission from the city to engage in any public address
on the Boston Common.26 In rejecting the notion that the ordinance was
unconstitutional, Holmes cited his prior opinion in McAuliffe, stating that
“the argument to that effect involves the same kind of fallacy that was
dealt with in McAuliffe v. New Bedford.”27 This “same kind of fallacy,” as
Holmes viewed it, revealed the complete blind spot for Holmes that con-
ditions placed on entry to a public park, like conditions placed on accept-
ance of a public job, were different in kind from similar conditions placed
on entry to land or acceptance of employment by private actors. “For the
legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a high-
way or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member
of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his
house.”28 The United States Supreme Court granted review of the
Holmes opinion and affirmed, quoting liberally from Holmes’s opinion
with enthusiastic approval.29 The greater power to exclude anyone from
the Boston Common, the Supreme Court reasoned, included the lesser
power to require advance permission. “The right to absolutely exclude all
right to use necessarily includes the authority to determine under what




24. Id. at 517–18.
25. Id. at 518.
26. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895).
27. Id. (citing McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 511).
28. Id.
29. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897).
30. Id.; see also Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1144–45 (10th Cir. 2016) (“In Davis,
the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a Boston city ordinance forbidding
‘any public address’ on public property ‘except in accordance with a permit from the
mayor.’ The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had affirmed a preacher’s conviction
for violating the ordinance by preaching on Boston Common without first obtaining a per-
mit from the mayor, stating ‘[f]or the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid pub-
lic speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a
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Modern constitutional law doctrine has rejected decisions such as Mc-
Auliffe and Davis. At the highest level of generality, that rejection is re-
flected in the demise of the so-called “right-privilege distinction.”31 The
mechanical notion that government has carte blanche to attach what con-
ditions it pleases on entry to public property or the receipt of government
benefits, such as public employment, public education, or public largess,
has been abandoned.32 The demise of the Holmes right-privilege distinc-
tion, however, has by no means been either clean or simple. An elaborate
body of law involving “unconstitutional conditions” has emerged in its
stead.33
The absolute power of the government to control the speech of govern-
ment employees that Holmes embraced in McAuliffe has been replaced
by a complex body of law providing some measure of First Amendment
protection for government employees—though that protection is far from
absolute. It is possible that a court today might even reach the same result
as Holmes reached in McAuliffe, but the doctrinal path would involve far
more intricate balancing than the simple one-liner that the petitioner
“has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”34 The modern Supreme
Court has thus recognized that “[t]he First Amendment generally prohib-
its government officials from dismissing or demoting an employee be-
cause of the employee’s engagement in constitutionally protected
political activity.”35
One line of government employment cases, curtailing the “spoils sys-
tem” and regimes of political patronage, generally forbids conditioning
government employment on political party affiliation,36 though this gen-
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.’ The
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, concluding that ‘[t]he right to absolutely exclude all
right to use necessarily includes the authority to determine under what circumstances such
use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser.’” (quoting Davis, 167 U.S.
at 44, 47–48)).
31. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinc-
tion in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
32. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“For at least a quarter-century,
this Court has made clear that even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable govern-
mental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to
a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.”). Holmes would use very much
the same patterns of thought when confronted with asserted constitutional rights to speak
on public property.
33. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 31, at 1445; Richard A. Epstein, The Su-
preme Court 1987 Term: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Con-
sent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (1988); Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 69, 85 (1982); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1415 (1989).
34. See McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
35. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1416 (2016).
36. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507, 519 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372–73 (1976).
466 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
eral rule is subject to an exception for high-ranking policymaking posi-
tions.37 The Supreme Court has upheld restrictions prohibiting certain
federal employees from engaging in partisan political management and
campaigning.38 And in a series of cases, the Supreme Court has evolved a
finely-tuned balancing test protecting the free speech rights of govern-
ment employees when they speak out as citizens on matters of public
concern, while providing no protection for the expressive activity of pub-
lic employees on matters within the workplace deemed not to be matters
of public concern.39
In the specific context of speech on public property, the absolute power
of the government to exclude expression in public parks, streets, or side-
walks has been replaced by an elaborate body of modern “public forum
law.” A park such as the Boston Common would today be classified a
“traditional public forum.” Modern Supreme Court opinions describe
spaces such as parks, streets, and sidewalks as places “which ‘have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions.’”40 I place in emphasis
the word “immemorially” and the phrase “time out of mind” because, as
the Davis litigation makes clear, the designation of public parks as dedi-
cated to free expression “immemorially” and “time out of mind” is a bit
of a stretch. It was entirely out of Holmes’s mind to imagine any general
constitutional right to speak freely in public parks.
While modern public forum law has “overruled” Holmes with regard to
speech in “traditional” and “designated” public forums,41 some vestige of
the Holmes view remains alive when it comes to “nonpublic forums,”
government property that is not by tradition or designation dedicated to
free expression. Rejecting the view that the famous “baby doctor” and
anti-war activist Dr. Benjamin Spock, who ran for President of the
United States as a candidate for the People’s Party, had a right to engage
in expressive protest on a military base, for example, the Supreme Court
stated that “[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
37. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (The public agency involved must “demonstrate that
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved”).
38. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 75 (1947) (rejecting a challenge
to the Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. § 9(a) (2012)); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 548 (1973) (affirming Mitchell and sustaining the Hatch Act).
39. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
142 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
40. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (empha-
sis added) (quoting Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
41. “Designated” public forums are government facilities, properties, or programs that
the government has of its own volition opened up to expressive activity, though it may not
have been required to create the forum in the first instance. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 267–68 (1981) (university meeting facilities); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 8 v. Wisconsin Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 174–75 (1976) (school board
meeting); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 548 (1975) (municipal theater).
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lawfully dedicated.”42 While this statement does seem to channel Holmes,
it is limited by its terms only to government property that is not a tradi-
tional or designated public forum.43
Moreover, modern First Amendment principles would instantly iden-
tify the requirement that a speaker wishing to preach on the Boston
Common obtain advance permission from the government, which was
empowered to exercise unchecked and uncheckable discretion in granting
or denying permission as a plainly unconstitutional prior restraint.44
The point here is not to criticize Holmes for failing to anticipate
nuanced and relatively dense doctrinal evolutions in constitutional law
that occurred decades after his views were stated. The point, to the con-
trary, is essentially the flip of that. As the nineteenth century moved into
the twentieth, the sensibilities of jurists, including Holmes, had yet to
evolve into anything remotely resembling our contemporary sensibilities
about freedom of speech.45
C. PATTERSON AND CONTEMPT
In Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, Thomas M. Patter-
son, a former United States Senator and the principal owner of the Den-
ver Times and the Rocky Mountain News, was held in contempt of court
by the Supreme Court of Colorado for materials published in his newspa-
pers critical of Colorado Supreme Court Justices.46 The gist of Patterson’s
publications was that utility companies controlled the Denver political
machine, which in turn exerted corrupt partisan influences on the rulings
of the Colorado Supreme Court, including decisions of the Colorado
court overturning certain election results to the benefit of Colorado
Republicans and the detriment of Colorado Democrats. The publications
deemed to be contemptuous were recounted at length in the opinion of
the Colorado Supreme Court. One made the general charge that the Col-
42. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,
48 (1966)).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (striking down restric-
tions on expressive activity at the United States Supreme Court Building to the extent that
the limitations extended to the public sidewalks around the Court grounds).
44. Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (“The Forsyth
County ordinance requiring a permit and a fee before authorizing public speaking, pa-
rades, or assemblies in ‘the archetype of a traditional public forum,’ is a prior restraint on
speech. Although there is a ‘heavy presumption’ against the validity of a prior restraint, the
Court has recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of public fo-
rums, may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally.
Such a scheme, however, must meet certain constitutional requirements. It may not dele-
gate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official. Further, any permit scheme
controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on the content of the
message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must
leave open ample alternatives for communication.” (citations omitted) (first quoting Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988); and then quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 48, 70 (1963))); see Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expres-
sion from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 316–17 (1986).
45. Gibson, supra note 44, at 316–17.
46. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 461 (1907).
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orado Supreme Court was illicitly controlled by the political machine and
the utility corporations.47 The second, a political cartoon in the Rocky
Mountain News, graphically conveyed a similar message of political influ-
ence.48 The third arguably went further, accusing the justices of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court of deciding cases in order to advance “a business
proposition that means millions upon millions” to their political
benefactors.49
The contempt convictions against Patterson reached the United States
Supreme Court. Holmes, now a United States Supreme Court Justice, re-
jected Patterson’s argument that his conviction violated the First Amend-
ment. Holmes noted that it was not at all clear that the First Amendment
applied at all to the states, though he proceeded to reach the merits of the
free speech claim on the assumption (without formally deciding) that the
free speech guarantee of the First Amendment applied to the states
47. People v. News-Times Pub. Co., 84 P. 912, 914 (Colo. 1906) (quoting the publica-
tion and the Colorado Supreme Court’s interpretation of it: “‘What next? If somebody will
let us know what next the utility corporations of Denver and the political machine they
control will demand the question will be answered.’ Meaning thereby that this court and
the justices thereof are controlled by certain corporations and by partisan political influ-
ence, and were so controlled in rendering the decision in said causes.”).
48. Id. (“The Attorney General further gives the court to understand and be informed
that on the 25th day of June, A. D. 1905, there appeared on the first page of the Rocky
Mountain News, one of said newspapers, so published as aforesaid, a certain cartoon and
illustration, wherein are shown caricatures of five members of this court, namely, Chief
Justice Gabbert, Mr. Justice Maxwell, Mr. Justice Bailey, Mr. Justice Campbell, and Mr.
Justice Goddard, and wherein Chief Justice Gabbert is represented as the ‘Lord High Ex-
ecutioner’ in the act of beheading certain persons described therein (being the incumbents
of certain county offices and the litigants mentioned in the foregoing causes, pending in
this court), with display headlines in large letters over said cartoon and illustration, reading
as follows, namely: ‘IF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY HAS OVERLOOKED ANY-
THING FROM THE SUPREME COURT IT WILL NOW PROCEED TO ASK FOR
IT.’ Also the following words appeared therein as describing this court, namely: ‘The Great
Judicial Slaughter-house and Mausoleum.’ Thereby meaning and intending to convey the
impression to the public that this court and the several members thereof, and especially
Chief Justice Gabbert, Mr. Justice Maxwell, Mr. Justice Bailey, Mr. Justice Campbell, and
Mr. Justice Goddard, were and are influenced by, and were and are under the control of,
the Republican party, and were and are governed by political prejudice, and that this court
is under the domination of a partisan political machine and of certain political bosses, and
were, at the time of rendering said decisions, and are at the present time, so influenced,
controlled, governed and dominated.”).
49. Id. (“I know as common history the influence that created the majority of the
court (meaning the Supreme Court of the state of Colorado) as it now is (meaning thereby
that undue influences were brought to bear in appointing certain judges of said court), and
I am old and experienced enough to judge of motives; and knowing the sponsors of the
Chief Justice (meaning Chief Justice Gabbert) and his colleague Goddard (meaning Mr.
Justice Goddard), and the interest they control, I am convinced that their intervention
after the last election to overturn the senate as it stood, and to bowl out Governor Adams
was not merely to prove themselves powerful bosses, or to advance themselves politically,
but it was to carry out a business proposition that means millions upon millions to them,
and especially to William G. Evans, the most consciousless boss that ever bestrode a suffer-
ing people (meaning that Chief Justice Gabbert and Mr. Justice Goddard were under the
control, directly or indirectly, through third persons, of William G. Evans, for the purpose
of carrying out certain business propositions which would bring millions upon millions of
dollars to said third person, unnamed, and especially to William G. Evans).”).
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through incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment.50 (The free
speech guarantee of the First Amendment would not be formally incor-
porated against state and local governments until 1925, in Gitlow v. New
York.51)
Holmes then proceeded to dispose of Patterson’s claims through a se-
ries of quite stunning pronouncements.
The guarantee of free speech in the First Amendment, Holmes wrote,
was intended only to prevent “previous restraints,” and not to prevent
subsequent punishments.52 Because Patterson was sanctioned for con-
tempt after his publications, the contempt was a “subsequent punish-
ment” not covered by the free speech guarantee at all.
Patterson claimed that his attacks on the Colorado Supreme Court
were true, and thus constitutionally immunized from any sanction.53
Holmes rebuffed Patterson’s assertion, refusing to accept the proposition
that the truth should set him free. Holmes borrowed from the traditional
common-law rule for criminal libel, under which truth was no defense.54
Indeed, a true libel was deemed more dangerous and harmful than a false
one. Holmes well knew the common-law maxim, “the greater the truth,
the greater the libel.”55 He invoked that maxim in Patterson,56 reasoning
that the contempt of the Colorado Supreme Court justices would be
“none the less a contempt that it was true.”57 A publication impugning
the administration of justice that reached the eyes of a jury, Holmes ex-
plained, would be no less damaging if true.58 Holmes maintained that
50. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (“But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech
and freedom of the press were protected from abridgments on the part not only of the
United States but also of the states, still we should be far from the conclusion that the
plaintiff in error would have us reach.”).
51. 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925).
52. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (“In the first place, the main purpose of such constitu-
tional provisions is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been
practised by other governments,’ and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of
such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Bland-
ing, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.). 304, 313–14 (Mass. 1825))).
53. Id. at 461 (“The defense upon which the plaintiff in error most relies is raised by
the allegation that the articles complained of are true, and the claim of the right to prove
the truth.”).
54. Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1098 n.27 (8th Cir. 1973) (“Whether libel
was true or false was irrelevant under English common law. This was because breach of
peace was regarded as the gist of the crime. As was said in the early English case, ‘[e]very
libel . . . is made either against a private man, or against a magistrate or public person. If it
be a private man it deserves a severe punishment, for although the libel be made against
one, yet it incites all those of the same family, kindred or society to revenge, and so tends
per consequens to quarrels and breach of the peace, and may be the cause of shedding of
blood, and of great inconvenience . . . . “ (alteration in original) (quoting de Libellis
Famosis (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251)).
55. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“If
the state adopted for civil proceedings the saying of the old criminal law: the greater the
truth, the greater the libel, the validity of the patent would not come in question at all.”).
56. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (“[T]he rule applied to criminal libels applies yet more
clearly to contempts.”).
57. Id.
58. Id. (“A publication likely to reach the eyes of a jury, declaring a witness in a pend-
ing cause a perjurer, would be none the less a contempt that it was true. It would tend to
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“[w]hat is true with reference to a jury is true also with reference to a
court.”59
There was an early free speech hero in Patterson, but it was not
Holmes. The champion was Justice John Marshall Harlan. Harlan’s dis-
senting opinion took sharp aim at Holmes’s cavalier refusal to state
whether the freedom of speech articulated in the First Amendment
should be deemed incorporated in the protection of deprivations of lib-
erty by states expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment. Harlan wrote el-
oquently that freedom of speech and press were essential parts of every
man’s liberty:
I go further and hold that the privileges of free speech and of a free
press, belonging to every citizen of the United States, constitute es-
sential parts of every man’s liberty, and are protected against viola-
tion by that clause of the 14th Amendment forbidding a state to
deprive any person of his liberty without due process of law. It is, I
think, impossible to conceive of liberty, as secured by the Constitu-
tion against hostile action, whether by the nation or by the states,
which does not embrace the right to enjoy free speech and the right
to have a free press.60
Harlan also frontally assaulted the claim by Holmes that freedom of
speech was limited to protection against previous restraints:
It yet proceeds to say that the main purpose of such constitutional
provisions was to prevent all such “previous restraints” upon publica-
tions as had been practised by other governments, but not to prevent
the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to
the public welfare. I cannot assent to that view, if it be meant that the
legislature may impair or abridge the rights of a free press and of
free speech whenever it thinks that the public welfare requires that
to be done. The public welfare cannot override constitutional privi-
leges, and if the rights of free speech and of a free press are, in their
essence, attributes of national citizenship, as I think they are, then
neither Congress nor any state, since the adoption of the 14th
Amendment, can, by legislative enactments or by judicial action, im-
pair or abridge them. In my judgment the action of the court below
was in violation of the rights of free speech and a free press as guar-
anteed by the Constitution.61
obstruct the administration of justice, because even a correct conclusion is not to be
reached or helped in that way, if our system of trials is to be maintained. The theory of our
system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and
argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public
print.”).
59. Id. at 462–63 (“Cases like the present are more likely to arise, no doubt, when
there is a jury, and the publication may affect their judgment. Judges generally perhaps are
less apprehensive that publications impugning their own reasoning or motives will interfere
with their administration of the law. But if a court regards, as it may, a publication con-
cerning a matter of law pending before it, as tending toward such an interference, it may
punish it . . . .”).
60. Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
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Yet Harlan’s incisive elegance left Holmes and the Court’s majority
unmoved. Patterson’s contempt for daring to call out what he perceived
as corruption in Colorado’s highest court was upheld, in a manner aston-
ishing when measured against modern First Amendment principles. As
Justice Black, writing for the Court in Bridges v. California pronounced:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding
judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of
American public opinion. . . . An enforced silence, however limited,
solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would
probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more
than it would enhance respect.62
“Although it is assumed that judges will ignore the public clamor or
media reports and editorials in reaching their decisions and by tradition
will not respond to public commentary, the law gives ‘[j]udges as persons,
or courts as institutions . . . no greater immunity from criticism than other
persons or institutions.’”63 Modern First Amendment cases would use
Holmes’s own later invention, the “clear and present danger” test, to
strike down attempts to invoke the contempt power in the service of pro-
tecting the reputation of judges and courts.64
D. LABOR UNREST AND MARTIAL LAW
The ferment that roiled the nation as Holmes ascended to the Supreme
Court included violent industrial strife. Confrontations between labor
and capital were often especially violent in the Rocky Mountain states,
with the government typically siding against the unions. The Western
Federation of Miners went on strike in Colorado in 1903, and Colorado
Governor James H. Peabody responded by declaring a state of emer-
gency, calling out the national guard, and imposing martial law.65
The Governor ordered one of the union leaders, Charles Moyer, ar-
rested and incarcerated. Moyer was held in jail, allegedly without proba-
ble cause and with no judicial process of any kind, for approximately ten
weeks. He sued, challenging his confinement as unconstitutional by
claiming he was incarcerated without due process of law. In Moyer v.
Peabody,66 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, rejected
62. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1941).
63. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838–39 (1978) (quoting
Bridges, 314 U.S. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
64. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962) (“Thus we have simply been told, as
a matter of law without factual support, that if a State is unable to punish persons for
expressing their views on matters of great public importance when those matters are being
considered in an investigation by the grand jury, a clear and present danger to the adminis-
tration of justice will be created. We find no such danger in the record before us. The type
of ‘danger’ evidenced by the record is precisely one of the types of activity envisioned by
the Founders in presenting the First Amendment for ratification.”).
65. Colorado Governor Sends Militia to Cripple Creek, HISTORY, https://www.history
.com/this-day-in-history/colorado-governor-sends-militia-to-cripple-creek [https://perma
.cc/6AW3-SJPT] (last updated Dec. 13, 2018).
66. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
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Moyer’s claim. Holmes stated that “what is due process of law depends
on circumstances.”67 The essence of due process “varies with the subject-
matter and the necessities of the situation.”68 Holmes wrote that there
are times when “summary proceedings suffice for taxes, and executive de-
cisions for exclusion from the country.”69
The observation by Holmes that summary due process may be all that
is required for “executive decisions for exclusion from the country” re-
tains its relevancy and was tested most recently in Trump v. Hawaii.70
The Court in Trump v. Hawaii upheld President Trump’s travel ban, ap-
plying a highly deferential standard of review because the ban allegedly
burdened not only foreign citizens seeking entry but the rights of Ameri-
can citizens, stating, “Although foreign nationals seeking admission have
no constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a circumscribed
judicial inquiry when the denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitu-
tional rights of a U.S. citizen.”71
Setting foreign travel bans aside, however, it is surely inconceivable
that any American court would today countenance the summary jailing of
a labor organizer leading a union strike without any due process of any
kind on the mere declaration of a state governor or the President of the
United States that a condition of emergency exists, at least in the absence
of a formal congressional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Yet
Holmes, apparently deaf to any of these civil liberties sensibilities,
blithely endorsed the Colorado Governor’s precipitous transition to a po-
lice state. No mind any checks and balances in times of civil disruption.
“When it comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a matter
involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he
deems the necessities of the moment,” Holmes wrote.72 “Public danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process.”73
E. NUDES AND PRUDES
In Fox v. Washington,74 Holmes again wrote for the Supreme Court in
rejecting a free speech challenge. Jay Fox was the editor of an article pub-
lished in Pierce County, Washington, in a small paper, the Agitator, enti-
tled “The Nude and the Prudes.”75 The article arose from an incident in
which Stella Thornhill, a member of an anarchist community on the Puget
Sound known as the “Home Colony,” was fined sixty-five dollars for in-
decent exposure for swimming in the nude.76 Thornhill claimed that she
67. Id. at 84.
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
71. Id. at 2402.
72. Moyer, 212 U.S. at 84.
73. Id.
74. 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
75. State v. Fox, 127 P. 1111, 1112 (Wash. 1912).
76. See RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 210 (1987).
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liked to swim nude because it helped her rheumatism.77 Thornhill’s fine
became a matter of some local controversy as it appears that, rheumatism
or not, many locals were unfavorably disposed toward nude swimming.
The article published in the Agitator took Thornhill’s side of the dispute,
praising Thornhill and the “Homeites” of the Home Colony for being a
community of free spirits, and mocking the local prudes who sought to
repress them.78
Fox was convicted and sentenced to two months in prison for violating
a Washington law declaring,
Every person who shall wilfully print, publish, edit, issue, or know-
ingly circulate, sell, distribute or display any book, paper, document,
or written or printed matter, in any form, advocating, encouraging or
inciting, or having a tendency to encourage or incite the commission
of any crime, breach of the peace, or act of violence, or which shall
tend to encourage or advocate disrespect for law or for any court or
courts of justice, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.79
The Supreme Court of Washington held that Fox appeared to concede
“that the article does tend to encourage disobedience and disrespect for
law; for it clearly does so.”80 Fox nonetheless argued that his article was
protected under the guarantees of freedom of speech and press.81 The
Supreme Court of Washington rejected the claim,82 and Holmes, writing
for a unanimous United States Supreme Court, rejected the claim as well.
Holmes recited the rule of construction that statues should be con-
strued, when possible, to avoid “doubtful constitutional questions,”83 and
interpreted the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision as construing
the Washington statute “as confined to encouraging an actual breach of
law.”84 Holmes thus avoided any need to decide whether a statute mak-
ing the mere expression of opinion criticizing a law could stand: “It does
not appear and is not likely that the statute will be construed to prevent
publications merely because they tend to produce unfavorable opinions
77. Id.
78. Fox, 236 U.S. at 276 (The article declared: “Home is a community of free spirits,
who came out into the woods to escape the polluted atmosphere of priest-ridden, conven-
tional society;’ that ‘one of the liberties enjoyed by the Homeites was the privilege to bathe
in evening dress, or with merely the clothes nature gave them, just as they chose;’ but that
‘eventually a few prudes got into the community and proceeded in the brutal, unneighborly
way of the outside world to suppress the people’s freedom,’ and that they had four persons
arrested on the charge of indecent exposure, followed in two cases, it seems, by sentences
to imprisonment. ‘And the perpetrators of this vile action wonder why they are being boy-
cotted.’ It goes on: ‘The well-merited indignation of the people has been aroused. Their
liberty has been attacked. The first step in the way of subjecting the community to all the
persecution of the outside has been taken. If this was let go without resistance the progress
of the prudes would be easy.’”).
79. Id. at 275–76 (quoting WASH. REM. & BAL. CODE § 2564 (1910)).
80. Fox, 127 P. at 1112.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Fox, 236 U.S. at 277.
84. Id.
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of a particular statute or of law in general.”85 In the case before the
Court, Fox had encouraged disregard of the law in a manner that Holmes
described, consistent with the common law, as “manifested disrespect, as
active disregard going beyond the line drawn by the law.”86 Like Pontius
Pilate, Holmes washed his hands of all judgment on nude swimming,
prosecution for nude swimming, or articles encouraging it.87 “All that
concerns us is that it cannot be said to infringe the Constitution of the
United States.”88
IV. THE TRILOGY OF ESPIONAGE ACT PROSECUTIONS
President Woodrow Wilson urged passage of what would become the
Espionage Act of 1917, arguing that immigrants entering the United
States included many who “poured the poison of disloyalty into the very
arteries of our national life.”89 In his State of the Union Address on De-
cember 7, 1915, President Wilson declared:
I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national peace
and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are citi-
zens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags
but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full
freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison
of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life; who have
sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government
into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it ef-
fective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase
our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue.90
The United States declared war on Germany in April of 1917 and, two
months later, the Espionage Act of 1917 was passed. Much of the Espio-
nage Act dealt with classic spying. Section 3 of the Act, however, banned
expression intending to interfere with the success of the military, promote
the success of the nation’s enemies, or obstruct recruitment and enlist-
ment in the armed services. Section 3 read in its entirety:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall wilfully make or
convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with
the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United
States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever when
the United States is at war, shall wilfully cause or attempt to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or
naval forces of the United States, or shall wilfully obstruct the
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 278 (“Of course we have nothing to do with the wisdom of the defendant, the
prosecution, or the act.”).
88. Id.
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the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years,
or both.91
The sweep of § 3 was, to say the least, vague.92 The law appeared to
criminalize expression intended to cause insubordination, disloyalty, and
obstruction of recruitment or enlistment, with no clear demarcation of
the meaning of those terms.93
A trilogy of three cases challenging convictions under the Act reached
the Supreme Court. All three were decided in March of 1919, while the
country was still engaged in World War I. In each of them, the convictions
were affirmed. In each of them, Holmes wrote the opinion for the Court.
A. SCHENCK
Schenck v. United States94 was the first cased decided, arising from the
prosecutions and convictions of Charles T. Schenck, the General Secre-
tary of the Philadelphia Socialist Party, and Dr. Elizabeth Baer, a mem-
ber of the Party’s Executive Committee. In August 1917, Schenck and
others mailed leaflets to men listed in newspapers as having passed their
draft board examinations. Over 15,000 one-page leaflets, containing ma-
terial on the front and back, were published. One side bore the title
“LONG LIVE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,”
the other, “ASSERT YOUR RIGHTS!”95 The leaflets quoted verbatim
the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment, which declares: “Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”96 Holmes sum-
marized the material in the leaflets in one paragraph:
The document in question upon its first printed side recited the first
section of the Thirteenth Amendment, said that the idea embodied
in it was violated by the conscription act and that a conscript is little
better than a convict. In impassioned language it intimated that con-
scription was despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong
against humanity in the interest of Wall Street’s chosen few. It said,
“Do not submit to intimidation,” but in form at least confined itself
to peaceful measures such as a petition for the repeal of the act. The
other and later printed side of the sheet was headed “Assert Your
Rights.” It stated reasons for alleging that any one violated the Con-
stitution when he refused to recognize “your right to assert your op-
position to the draft,” and went on “If you do not assert and support
your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the
91. Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
92. See THOMAS REED, AMERICA’S TWO CONSTITUTIONS: A STUDY IN THE TREAT-
MENT OF DISSENTERS IN TIME OF WAR 113 (2017).
93. Id.
94. 249 U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919).
95. POLENBERG, supra note 76, at 212.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to re-
tain.” It described the arguments on the other side as coming from
cunning politicians and a mercenary capitalist press, and even silent
consent to the conscription law as helping to support an infamous
conspiracy. It denied the power to send our citizens away to foreign
shores to shoot up the people of other lands, and added that words
could not express the condemnation such cold-blooded ruthlessness
deserves, &c., &c., winding up, “You must do your share to maintain,
support and uphold the rights of the people of this country.”97
The indictment, as described by Holmes, charged the defendants of:
Causing and attempting to cause insubordination, &c., in the military
and naval forces of the United States, and to obstruct the recruiting
and enlistment service of the United States, when the United States
was at war with the German Empire, to-wit, that the defendant
wilfully conspired to have printed and circulated to men who had
been called and accepted for military service . . . , a document set
forth and alleged to be calculated to cause such insubordination and
obstruction.98
Schenck was convicted of violating the Espionage Act and sentenced to
six months imprisonment. Dr. Baer was also convicted; she received a
sentence of ninety days.99
The lawyers for Schenck and Baer, Henry J. Gibbons and Henry John
Nelson, argued their free speech defense vigorously in their brief to the
Supreme Court. “[H]ow can a speaker or writer be said to be free to
discuss the actions of the Government if twenty years in prison stares him
in the face if he makes a mistake and says too much?” they asserted.100
“Severe punishment for sedition will stop political discussion as effec-
tively as censorship.”101 The petitioners (then called “plaintiffs in error”)
noted that Thomas Jefferson had treated as unconstitutional the Sedition
Act of 1798, which, they said, “wrecked the Federalist Party.”102 They
argued that the Federalist giant Alexander Hamilton later defended a
Federalist editor from prosecution.103 The Brief resonated with themes of
freedom to dissent against government and the importance of free discus-
sion to the spread of truth:
The spread of truth in matters of general concern is essential to the
stability of a republic. How can truth survive if force is to be used,
possibly on the wrong side? Absolutely unlimited discussion is the
only means by which to make sure that “truth is mighty and will
prevail.”
97. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 50–51.
98. Id. at 48–49.
99. POLENBERG, supra note 76, at 212–13.
100. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at *6, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Nos.
1017, 1018), 1919 WL 20713, at *6.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *6, *8.
103. Id. at *6.
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This does not mean a man may with impunity violate the Draft Law
by refusing to do military service when so required; but it does mean
he can say the Draft Law is wrong and ought to be repealed. Some of
our judges have made this distinction; while others virtually make all
opposition to the war criminal.
It can be even urged farther that the right of free speech, if it is al-
lowed fully, gives the right to persuade another to violate a law,
since, legally, it is only the one who actually violates the law who
should be punished. It is no excuse for a thief to say John Jones per-
suaded him to steal; or, as the homely adage has it, “you don’t have
to put your hand into the fire because I tell you to do so.”
This is the distinction between words and acts.
. . . .
If all opponents of a war are suppressed and all advocates of a war
are given free rein, is it not conceivable that a peace-loving president
might be prevented from making an early, honorable peace, founded
on justice! How can the citizens find out whether a war is just or
unjust unless there is free and full discussion! If it is criminal to say
the Draft Law is wrong, then it is criminal to say that any law is
wrong, for the Constitution, we are told, is not suspended in time of
war; but we dare not attack it or our form of government. It is con-
ceivable, under such a rule, that a citizen might be a criminal who
advocated the election of senators by popular vote, the adoption of
the referendum, or what not; but probably such would only be the
case in time of war when he might thereby give aid and comfort to
the enemy.
Must we return to conditions which prevailed under George III and
be punished for criticizing our Government?104
The Brief recited the massive specter of prosecution under the Espionage
Act, noting that the Department of Justice had announced a total of
nearly 1,200 Espionage Act cases, with 125 convictions and 672 cases
pending.105
The brief for the United States argued that the circulars distributed by
the defendants went well beyond “legitimate political agitation for the
repeal of the draft law,” but rather “involved attempting to induce young
men subject to the draft law to disobey the requirements of that law.”106
This was established, the government argued, by the “fact that they chose
men already drafted and called as the persons to whom to address their
arguments.”107 Holmes and a unanimous Supreme Court were unmoved
by the free speech arguments advanced by Schenck, Baer, and their law-
yers. Holmes’s opinion in Schenck did backtrack a bit from Patterson,
conceding the possibility that the First Amendment might reach subse-
quent punishments and was not confined merely to a ban on previous
104. Id. at *6–8.
105. Id. at *8.
106. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 100, at *12–13.
107. Id. at *13.
478 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
restraints.108 But for Schenck and Baer, it went downhill from there.
The first dagger came with Holmes making the simple point that the
document circulated would not have been sent unless it was intended to
have “some effect.” Justice Holmes wrote, “Of course the document
would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have some ef-
fect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon
persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the car-
rying of it out.”109 The issue was punctuated with the emphasis that the
defendants did not contest this point.110
The Holmes opinion then opined on the difference between speech
published in times of war and speech published in times of peace. “We
admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying
all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitu-
tional rights.”111 This was followed by the key passage in Schenck, for
which the Holmes opinion is most famously remembered:
But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against ut-
tering words that may have all the effect of force. The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected
by any constitutional right.112
The phrase in the middle of this passage, requiring a “clear and present
danger,” arguably held some promise for significant protection of free-
dom of speech. That promise proved illusory, however, in Schenck itself
and through most of the next one hundred years. While “clear and pre-
sent danger” stuck as a phrase that falls trippingly off the tongues of law-
yers and judges, it was no friend to protection of free speech in Schenck
and proved ambivalent at best as a formula for protecting free speech in
the decades that followed. The phrase would ultimately be replaced by
the three-part incitement test of Brandenburg v. Ohio,113 in which the
Court held that the “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
108. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51–52 (“It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging
the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may
have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado.” (citation omitted)).
109. Id. at 51.
110. Id. (“The defendants do not deny that the jury might find against them on this
point.”).
111. Id. at 52.
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to incit-
ing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action.”114
Considered in its context, however, the Holmes formulation in Schenck
is widely recognized as not very protective of free speech at all. There
was, first, his famous line about “falsely shouting fire in a crowded thea-
tre.” This line, which would become one of the most oft-repeated cliche´s
in American discourse, drew intense fire virtually from the beginning.115
But more importantly, as already noted, the opinion openly reduced the
protection given speech in times of war, substantially diluting the mean-
ing of the words “clear” and “present,” morphing them into little more
than the “bad tendency” test Holmes had embraced in his prewar opin-
ions. The tepid protection Holmes envisioned was captured in this pallid
observation that the speech would not have been published unless it were
intended to have “some effect.” The phrase “some effect” did not require
much. It was enough for Holmes that the leaflets were sent to “influence”
persons to not subject themselves to the draft. This was essentially an act
of common-law “attempt,” and Holmes made it clear that success was not
required to impose criminal liability. It was enough that the leaflets were
sent with the requisite intent, coupled with their mere tendency for them
to cause harm:
It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting
service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect
might be enforced. The statute of 1917 in section 4 (Comp. St. 1918,
§ 10212d) punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual obstruc-
tion. If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and
the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground
for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.116
114. Id. at 447.
115. See Carlton F.W. Larson, “Shouting ‘Fire’ in A Theater”: The Life and Times of
Constitutional Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 181, 183–84
(2015) (“The inaptness of the analogy was noted almost immediately. Writing a few
months after Schenck was decided, Professor Ernst Freund of the University of Chicago
Law School found the analogy ‘manifestly inappropriate’ in the context of ‘implied provo-
cation in connection with political offenses.’ Professor Zechariah Chafee of Harvard Law
School argued that a much closer analogy to Schenck was a ‘man who gets up in a theater
between the acts and informs the audience honestly but perhaps mistakenly that the fire
exits are too few or locked.’ Such perplexing cases ‘cannot be solved by the multiplication
of obvious examples, but only by the development of a rational principle to mark the limits
of constitutional protection.’ H. L. Mencken argued in 1926 that the theater example was
unique because ‘there is no opportunity for persons who know that there is no fire to state
the fact calmly, and prove it.’ One of Freund’s successors at the University of Chicago,
Professor Harry Kalven, would later describe the analogy as ‘trivial and misleading,’ noting
that because it ‘is so wholly apolitical, it lacks the requisite complexity for dealing with any
serious speech problem likely to confront the legal system.’” (first quoting Ernst Freund,
The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1919, at 13, 14; then quot-
ing Zechariah Chafee Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 944
(1919); then quoting H.L. Mencken, On Liberty, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 21, 1926, at H1;
and then quoting HARRY KALVEN JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA 133-34 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988))).
116. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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This was no libertarian manifesto protecting freedom of speech. This
was affirming the power of government to ban expression intended to
and tending to cause harm—period. The “clear and present danger” lan-
guage was misleading, nothing more than cosmetic window-dressing. It
was not Schenck’s load-bearing substance.117
A week after Schenck, Holmes again affirmed two convictions under
the Espionage Act, in Frohwerk v. United States118 and Debs v. United
States,119 decided the same day. In neither case did Holmes even use the
phrase “clear and present danger.”
B. FROHWERK
Frohwerk arose from a series of articles critical of the war effort pub-
lished by Jacob Frohwerk in Staats-Zeitung, a German language newspa-
per in Missouri with a minuscule circulation. Frohwerk’s articles asserted
that it was a monumental and inexcusable mistake to send American
soldiers to France, and touted the “undiminished strength” and “uncon-
querable spirit” of the German people.120 After describing the plight of
the draftee, one article asked rhetorically who would pronounce the
draftee guilty for following “the first impulse of nature: self-preserva-
tion.”121 Frohwerk was convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 and
sentenced to a fine and ten years imprisonment.
In affirming the conviction, Holmes observed that freedom of speech
“cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language.”122 Moving away from his fire in a theater
analogy, Holmes instead invoked counseling to commit murder: “We ven-
ture to believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other compe-
tent person then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the
counselling of a murder within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an
unconstitutional interference with free speech.”123
Holmes seemed to harbor at least a modicum of sympathy for poor
Frohwerk, whom Holmes described as a “poor man, turning out copy for
Gleeser, his employer, at less than a day laborer’s pay, for Gleeser to use
or reject as he saw fit, in a newspaper of small circulation . . . .”124 Moreo-
117. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1261 (1983) (“Holmes in Schenck inferred intent from the probable
consequences and surrounding circumstances of speech. This sequence, contrary to the
subsequent assertions of Chafee and others, strongly suggests that Holmes did not consider
‘clear and present danger’ a libertarian replacement for the ‘bad tendency’ doctrine he
himself had often invoked in prior decisions. It seems inconceivable that Holmes would use
the word ‘tendency,’ stress the unimportance of a successful act, and rely on cases that did
not demonstrate any sensitivity to free speech in order to elaborate a libertarian test de-
signed as a constitutional bar to convictions based on predicting the tendency of speech.”).
118. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
119. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
120. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 207.
121. Id. at 208.
122. Id. at 206.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 208.
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ver, the record before the Court was scant, with little factual detail estab-
lishing Frohwerk’s intent or the impact of his publications. Holmes noted
that Frohwerk’s articles actually had condemned violence, deploring draft
riots in Oklahoma and elsewhere, though in the same breath Holmes sug-
gested that the language Frohwerk used “might be taken to convey an
innuendo of a different sort.”125
A conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act, Holmes asserted, “could be
accomplished or aided by persuasion as well as by false statements.”126
Returning to the theme in Schenck regarding expression in times of war
and in times of peace, Holmes introduced a nuance that had not been
addressed in Schenck. Much of what Frohwerk had written was plainly
just opinion. Holmes noted that Frohwerk had argued that in entering the
War, America was “ruled by England,” and that the men who had led the
nation into war were wrong and had given false and hypocritical reasons
for the course.127 Holmes admitted that opinions such as these “might be
said or written even in time of war in circumstances that would not make
it a crime.”128 Thus, even in times of war, Holmes seemed to admit
Frohwerk had some right to express these opinions: “We do not lose our
right to condemn either measures or men because the country is at
war.”129
Yet if this were true, what then were the “circumstances” that made
Frohwerk’s utterances of these views a crime punishable by ten years in
prison? Holmes conceded that, unlike Schenck, the circumstances did not
include targeted mailing to persons who had already been drafted, noting
that “[i]t does not appear that there was any special effort to reach men
who were subject to the draft.”130
Well, then, what was there? The shocking answer was essentially noth-
ing, save shear speculation. The record did not demonstrate that circum-
stances justifying Frohwerk’s conviction existed. But the record also did
not demonstrate that the circumstances did not exist. So Holmes effec-
tively ruled that ties went to the government:
But we must take the case on the record as it is, and on that record it
is impossible to say that it might not have been found that the circu-
lation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be
enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied
upon by those who sent the paper out.131
Frohwerk is in many ways the most shocking case of the trilogy.
Frohwerk received a ruinous sentence of ten years in jail for expressing
views that can only be fairly characterized as political opinion opposing a
controversial war. No palpable evidence of illicit intent or harmful impact
125. Id. at 207.
126. Id. at 209.
127. Id. at 208.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 209.
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was presented to the Court. On the mere speculation that despite his con-
demnation of violence, Frohwerk intended to communicate “an innuendo
of a different sort,” or the mere speculation that his opinions could have
been circulated in quarters “where a little breath would be enough to
kindle a flame,” his speech was rendered criminal.
C. DEBS
The third case in the trilogy involved the most famous person to ever
be prosecuted under the Espionage Act, Eugene Debs. Rising to national
prominence as a labor leader in the 1890s, Debs led a successful strike for
higher wages against the Great Northern Railroad in 1894. He became a
hero of the union movement when he served a six-month jail term for his
role in the infamous Chicago Pullman Strike. Debs was a charismatic and
compassionate orator and leader. After campaigning for the populist Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan for president in 1896, Debs founded the Socialist
Party of America and became a perineal candidate for president in his
own right, running four times as the Socialist Party’s candidate for
president.132
On June 16, 1918, Debs was speaking in Canton, Ohio. The orator’s
principal themes were the future of American socialism and the immoral-
ity of the United States’ involvement in World War I. Debs stated that he
had just returned from a visit to three comrades who were in prison for
aiding and abetting resistance to the draft: Charles E. Ruthenberg, Alfred
Wagenknecht, and Charles Baker.133 The convictions of Ruthenberg, Wa-
genknecht, and Baker had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Janu-
ary of 1918.134 Debs thought they were paying the penalty for their
devotion to the working class, remarking that “he was proud of them.”135
Debs stated that “the master class has always declared the war and the
subject class has always fought the battles . . . the subject class has had
nothing to gain and all to lose, including their lives,” and “the working
class, who furnish the corpses, have never yet had a voice in declaring war
and have never yet had a voice in declaring peace.”136 “You need to
know that you are fit for something better than slavery and cannon fod-
der,” Debs proclaimed.137
Holmes recounted at length the substance of Debs’s speech, noting
particularly Debs’s professed allegiance and admiration for other con-
victed draft obstructers, including Ruthenberg, Wagenknecht, Baker,
Rose Pastor Stokes, and Kate Richards O’Hare. Holmes also described
evidence introduced at Debs’s trial that Debs had professed support for a
manifesto entitled the “Anti-War Proclamation and Program,” adopted
132. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS: LIBEL, THE MEDIA, AND POWER 46
(1986).
133. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212–13 (1919).
134. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 483 (1918).
135. Debs, 249 U.S. at 213.
136. Id. at 213–14.
137. Id. at 214.
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at St. Louis in April 1917, which declared: “We brand the declaration of
war by our Governments as a crime against the people of the United
States and against the nations of the world. In all modern history there
has been no war more unjustifiable than the war in which we are about to
engage.”138
At his trial, Debs elected to address the jury himself. He argued that
his speech did not warrant conviction for violation of the Espionage Act.
But in a courageous, if not foolhardy flourish, he also declared: “I have
been accused of obstructing the war. I admit it. Gentlemen, I abhor war. I
would oppose the war if I stood alone.”139 Holmes turned this statement
by Debs against him, observing somewhat snidely that,
The statement was not necessary to warrant the jury in finding that
one purpose of the speech, whether incidental or not does not mat-
ter, was to oppose not only war in general but this war, and that the
opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended effect
would be to obstruct recruiting.140
The snarky opening to this sentence, stating that the statement “was not
necessary” to the jury’s finding, was Holmes engaging in the very word-
play for which Holmes had blasted Jacob Frohwerk, “an innuendo of a
different sort.”141 Holmes’s passive-aggressive innuendo was that Debs’s
statement to the jury, if “not necessary,” was surely sufficient to uphold
Debs’s conviction. As Holmes said in the very next sentence, “If that was
intended and if, in all the circumstances, that would be its probable effect,
it would not be protected by reason of its being part of a general program
and expressions of a general and conscientious belief.”142
Holmes pointed out that the St. Louis “Anti-War Proclamation and
Program” to which Debs subscribed promoted “continuous, active, and
public opposition to the war, through demonstrations, mass petitions, and
all other means within our power.”143 For Holmes, this was the clincher.
If Debs believed in this program, then Debs’s speech in Canton could
have been a manifestation of that belief, and on those grounds alone,
enough to justify sending Debs to prison:
Evidence that the defendant accepted this view and this declaration
of his duties at the time that he made his speech is evidence that if in
that speech he used words tending to obstruct the recruiting service
he meant that they should have that effect. The principle is too well
established and too manifestly good sense to need citation of the
books. We should add that the jury were most carefully instructed
that they could not find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of
his opinions unless the words used had as their natural tendency and
reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service, &c.,
138. Id. at 216.
139. Id. at 214.
140. Id. at 214–15.
141. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 207 (1919).
142. Debs, 249 U.S. at 215.
143. Id. at 216.
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and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so in his
mind.144
V. THE ABRAMS TRANSFORMATION
Frank Abrams was one of five Russian immigrants who had printed
5,000 leaflets written in English and Yiddish, protesting the combination
of “German militarism” and “allied capitalism” to “crush the Russian
revolution.”145 When the Czarist regime in Russia was overthrown in the
Bolshevik Revolution, Russia signed a peace treaty with Germany. In the
summer of 1918, American marines were sent to Vladivostok and Mur-
mansk. This intervention by the United States was perceived by Abrams
and his comrades as antagonistic to the new Russian revolution.146
The majority opinion in Abrams was written by Justice John Hessin
Clarke. The opinion provided a candid portrait of how the majority per-
ceived the defendants: “They were intelligent, had considerable school-
ing, and at the time they were arrested they had lived in the United States
terms varying from five to ten years, but none of them had applied for
naturalization.”147 Justice Clarke’s opinion went to unusual lengths to
quote lavishly from the leaflets, reciting their attacks on President Wilson
and America’s intervention in Russia. The opinion summarized the leaf-
lets as, on their surface, communicating resentment over the sending of
American troops to Russia, but having as their deeper and intended
meaning sedition, riots, revolution, and obstruction of the American war
effort.148 The defendants were convicted and sentenced to terms ranging
from three to twenty years in prison, and the Supreme Court, following
the roadmap in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, affirmed.
The transformation in Oliver Wendell Holmes that was manifest in his
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States is probably the most deeply
explored flip in legal thinking in the history of American law. The law
itself of course changes all the time. Major constitutional principles get
overruled—as Brown v. Board of Education149 overruled the “separate
but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,150 or Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal151 overruled the substantive economic due process principles of Loch-
ner v. New York.152 And individual Justices have been known to change
144. Id.
145. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 625 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
146. See POLENBERG, supra note 76, at 124.
147. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617.
148. Id. at 623. (“These excerpts sufficiently show, that while the immediate occasion
for this particular outbreak of lawlessness, on the part of the defendant alien anarchists,
may have been resentment caused by our government sending troops into Russia as a
strategic operation against the Germans on the eastern battle front, yet the plain purpose
of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection, sedition,
riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country for the purpose of embarrassing and if
possible defeating the military plans of the government in Europe.”).
149. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
150. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
151. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
152. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2019] And the Truth Shall Make You Free 485
their views on specific issues and on general approaches to constitutional
interpretation as their jurisprudence evolves over the course of their ten-
ure.153 Justices appointed by presidents expecting to get safe conservative
or liberal votes on the Court have, on more than one occasion, been un-
pleasantly surprised.154
So the law changes direction, and individual jurists change their minds.
But for one powerful, intellectually dominant Supreme Court Justice,
who had been the chief intellectual architect of one view of the law, to
suddenly, within the course of months, become the prophet and cham-
pion of an opposite view, is rare. So rare, indeed, that it does not appear
to have ever happened before Holmes’s 1919 shift and does not appear to
have happened since.
Many brilliant scholars have documented the dramatic shift in position
of Holmes from Schenck to Abrams and explored in detail the mystery of
who or what caused Holmes to change his mind. The shift in Holmes may
be overdetermined, in that there are, as a fictional detective might pro-
test, too many clues as to what precipitated the change.
David Rabban, the leading American legal historian of the period,
points to a number of factors.155 Holmes had been influenced by criti-
cisms of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs by Harvard Law School’s Profes-
sor Zechariah Chafee and Judge Learned Hand and the writings of
Professor Ernst Freund of the University of Chicago Law School.156 The
excesses of post-World War I anticommunist hysteria alarmed many, in-
cluding Holmes.157 The Red Scare of 1919, and the national debate over
the wisdom of the Treaty of Versailles, may have led Holmes to be more
introspective about using law to enforce prevailing wisdom.158
The relationship between Holmes and Learned Hand is particularly in-
triguing. Hand had written a highly-publicized 1917 opinion in Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten.159 In his opinion Hand issued an injunction
prohibiting the Postmaster General from suppressing distribution of the
magazine the Masses.160 While technically the case was not a First
Amendment decision, but an interpretation of the Espionage Act, it was
widely perceived as the most pro-free speech judicial opinion of its time.
Hand accepted that the magazine’s agenda was to attack with the “utmost
153. Justice Harry Blackmun is probably the most famous example. See LINDA GREEN-
HOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY
110–13 (2005).
154. See Ronald L. Feinman, These 9 Justices Failed to Vote the Way Their Party Ex-
pected, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 14, 2018), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/
170179 [https://perma.cc/RP7T-DNB9] (listing Justices Felix Frankfurter, Byron White,
Earl Warren, William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day
O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter).
155. Rabban, supra note 117, at 1311–15.
156. Id. at 1312–13.
157. Id. at 1313.
158. Id.
159. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
160. Id. at 543.
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violence the draft and the war.”161 Hand also conceded that these attacks
tended to arouse emulation. What was not so plain, Hand insisted, was
that the attacks actually counseled or caused law-breaking.162 Much of
Hand’s language in Masses was, then and now, a powerful defense of free
speech. At the heart of his opinion was a rejection of the notion that the
mere “bad tendency” of the material to foment disregard of the law or
the nation’s war effort was enough to justify its suppression:
The defendant’s position is that to arouse discontent and disaffection
among the people with the prosecution of the war and with the draft
tends to promote a mutinous and insubordinate temper among the
troops. This, too, is true; men who become satisfied that they are
engaged in an enterprise dictated by the unconscionable selfishness
of the rich, and effectuated by a tyrannous disregard for the will of
those who must suffer and die, will be more prone to insubordination
than those who have faith in the cause and acquiesce in the means.
Yet to interpret the word ‘cause’ so broadly would, as before, involve
necessarily as a consequence the suppression of all hostile criticism,
and of all opinion except what encouraged and supported the ex-
isting policies, or which fell within the range of temperate argument.
It would contradict the normal assumption of democratic govern-
ment that the suppression of hostile criticism does not turn upon the
justice of its substance or the decency and propriety of its temper.
Assuming that the power to repress such opinion may rest in Con-
gress in the throes of a struggle for the very existence of the state, its
exercise is so contrary to the use and wont of our people that only
the clearest expression of such a power justifies the conclusion that it
was intended.163
Hand’s opinion was reversed on appeal by the Second Circuit in an
opinion that sharply reproved Hand’s position:
This court does not agree that such is the law. If the natural and
reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage resistance to a law,
and the words are used in an endeavor to persuade to resistance, it is
immaterial that the duty to resist is not mentioned, or the interest of
the persons addressed in resistance is not suggested. That one may
willfully obstruct the enlistment service, without advising in direct
language against enlistments, and without stating that to refrain from
enlistment is a duty or in one’s interest, seems to us too plain for
controversy. To obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service, within
the meaning of the statute, it is not necessary that there should be a
physical obstruction. Anything which impedes, hinders, retards, re-
strains, or puts an obstacle in the way of recruiting is sufficient.164
The Second Circuit’s view would later be essentially the view adopted
by Holmes in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. Yet in Abrams, Holmes ap-
161. Id. at 541.
162. Id. at 540–41 (“That such comments have a tendency to arouse emulation in others
is clear enough, but that they counsel others to follow these examples is not so plain.”).
163. Id. at 539–540.
164. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917).
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peared to move more in the direction of Hand in Masses. Was Hand re-
sponsible for Holmes’s change?
Estimable scholars have retraced the correspondence between Hand
and Holmes during this period.165 An indication of how far apart Hand
and Holmes were in their basic instincts about freedom of speech, at least
early in their correspondence, is a one-liner from one of the Holmes let-
ters to Hand in which Holmes quipped, “Free speech stands no differ-
ently than freedom from vaccination.”166
So too, many have speculated on a fateful train ride. By serendipity,
Hand and Holmes shared a train ride on June 19, 1918, between New
York and Boston, while Holmes was on his way from Washington to his
home in Massachusetts following the end of the Supreme Court term, and
Hand traveling to his summer home in New Hampshire. Their conflicting
views of free speech were discussed on the train ride, though there is little
record of who said exactly what.167 What the record of interaction be-
tween Holmes and Hand does appear to reveal is that, at least in the early
going, Hand’s views had little impact on Holmes.168
I leave to better detectives the ongoing exploration of what caused
Holmes to change.169 My modest point in this essay is simply to suggest
that it is too easy to adopt the simple narrative that the early Holmes was
wrong, and he “just didn’t get it,” but then he saw the light and came
around to the truth, which ultimately set him and the nation free. That
narrative does not do justice to the internal struggle that the two con-
testing positions must have occupied within the mind of Holmes, or to the
struggle of the two contesting positions within the larger American mind.
It is worth first remembering that Holmes himself claimed in Abrams
to see no dissonance between his own prior opinions in Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs and his dissent in Abrams. Holmes does not say in
Abrams, “Hey, I was wrong in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, and to be
honest, also wrong in McAuliffe, Davis, Patterson, Moyer, and Fox. I once
was lost, but now I’m found, was blind, but now I see.”
To the contrary, Holmes in Abrams clung to the claim that Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs were rightly decided:
I never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that
alone were before this Court in the Cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and
Debs were rightly decided. I do not doubt for a moment that by the
same reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion to murder,
165. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722 (1975).
166. Id. at 756–57.
167. See HEALY, supra note 5, at 36.
168. Gunther, supra note 165, at 732 (“A year after Masses, months before Schenck,
Holmes and Hand were indeed very far apart: Hand argued the case for protecting the
dissenter; Holmes disagreed. That was a gap in values all the more remarkable because
Hand and Holmes shared a common philosophical outlook in most respects.”); see also
Rabban, supra note 117, at 1281.
169. Professor Thomas Healy’s fine scholarship on the question has been given book
treatment. See generally HEALY, supra, note 5.
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the United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces
or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will
bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States
constitutionally may seek to prevent. The power undoubtedly is
greater in time of war than in time of peace because war opens dan-
gers that do not exist at other times.170
Can we spell “DENIAL”?
It was entirely disingenuous for Holmes to dismiss Schenck, Frohwerk,
and Debs as presenting “questions of law alone” in some sense different
from Abrams. All four of the cases presented the application of law to
fact, and in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, Holmes himself had gone into
significant factual detail to explain why the facts in each case justified a
conclusion that the expression could have been intended and could have
had a tendency to produce an illegal outcome.
So too, neither the actual message contained in the pamphlets distrib-
uted in Abrams nor the intent of the defendants in Abrams can be distin-
guished, in any principled manner, from the expression in Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs. The expression in all four cases (the trilogy cases
and Abrams) was laced with diatribe against World War I and the draft
and, in all four cases, was plainly intended to persuade others to engage
in resistance. If tendency and intent were all the Constitution required,
then all four cases would turn out the same way—which is exactly what
the majority opinion for the Court reasoned.
Similarly, there is little traction to be gained in trying to draw some line
between the potency of the speech in Abrams and the potency of the
speech in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. In one paragraph of his dissent
in Abrams, Holmes does a magnificent job of presenting the case that the
leaflets distributed by the defendants in Abrams could not plausibly have
caused much real harm to the nation or the war effort, and certainly not
enough to justify their punishing jail terms:
In this case sentences of twenty years imprisonment have been im-
posed for the publishing of two leaflets that I believe the defendants
had as much right to publish as the Government has to publish the
Constitution of the United States now vainly invoked by them. Even
if I am technically wrong and enough can be squeezed from these
poor and puny anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus paper; I
will add, even if what I think the necessary intent were shown; the
most nominal punishment seems to me all that possibly could be in-
flicted, unless the defendants are to be made to suffer not for what
the indictment alleges but for the creed that they avow-a creed that I
believe to be the creed of ignorance and immaturity when honestly
held, as I see no reason to doubt that it was held here but which,
although made the subject of examination at the trial, no one has a
170. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (ci-
tations omitted); see also Rabban, supra note 117, at 1280 (“But as to the legal questions
before the Supreme Court in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, Holmes repeatedly empha-
sized that he had no doubts.”).
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right even to consider in dealing with the charges before the
Court.171
While not the most famous passage of his dissent in Abrams, the writ-
ing in the paragraph above is worth savoring for its sheer poetic beauty.
The phrase in which Holmes rhetorically asks whether “enough can be
squeezed from these poor and puny anonymities to turn the color of legal
litmus paper” is one of the most creative uses of language in the history of
American law. And when Holmes appeals to our conscience to demon-
strate what, at least by our current sensibilities, we know was absolutely
true—that the Abrams defendants were in fact punished for “the creed
they avow”—Holmes was speaking heart to heart, in a manner reminis-
cent of Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy.172
Even so, if the statements in Abrams were “poor and puny anonymi-
ties,” then surely the leaflets in Schenck and the articles in Frohwerk were
as well.
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams was a break from the Court’s past and his
own past on multiple levels. First, in an important clarification, Holmes
made it clear that the formal test for First Amendment protection does
not change when the nation is at war. However, the fact that the nation is
at war may be salient to its application, because the existence of the war
may trigger governmental interests that would not exist in times of peace,
as the “war opens up dangers that do not exist at other times,” but the
“principle of the right to free speech is always the same.”173
VI. THE ONGOING DEBATE OVER WHETHER THE TRUTH
SHALL MAKE US FREE
Let us now consider the most famous paragraph in the Holmes dissent
in Abrams. It is also the most famous paragraph in the history of Ameri-
can free speech law. While it is one continuous paragraph, let us break it
171. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629–30 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
172. In Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy, he ultimately spoke to what, as he put
it, “all will admit” was the true purpose of the Louisiana law. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“What can more certainly arouse race hate, what
more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state
enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens?
That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in
Louisiana.”).
173. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The power undoubtedly is
greater in time of war than in time of peace because war opens dangers that do not exist at
other times. But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of the
right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an
intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opin-
ion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to
change the mind of the country. Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing
of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger
that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable
tendency to do so.”).
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up into two parts. The first part, which comes before the fateful word
“but,” reflects the views of the early Holmes:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly log-
ical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in
law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech
seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man
says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your
premises.174
These opening lines sum up everything Holmes previously had believed
and said both in his published opinions and in his private correspondence.
Holmes clearly had believed that it was both logical and permissible to
stamp out expressions of opinion that the government believed were bad
for the country. The loose bad tendency test of Schenck, Frohwerk, and
Debs fits perfectly within these early lines. But then everything changes:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is
an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if not every
day, we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon
imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system, I
think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interfer-
ence with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an imme-
diate check is required to save the country.175
Holmes tells us to tolerate speech we loathe, speech we are convinced
is fraught with death. It is the marketplace, not law, which will decide the
value of speech. The government may intervene through the force of law
only if there is an immediate need to check the speech to save the country.
The first part of the famous Abrams Holmes dissent, reprising the early
Holmes, is grounded in logic. The second part—everything that follows
the word “but”—is grounded in faith. Our minds tell us to suppress bad
speech, such as claims by modern alt-right and neo-Nazi members that
Jews and Blacks should be banned from America, because in our minds
we absolutely are convinced these views are evil and will never lead to
truth. Yet Holmes exhorts us to resist what our minds insist, and instead
place faith in an abstraction, the marketplace of ideas.
174. Id. at 630.
175. Id.
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The early Holmes, the bad tendency test, has always exerted a powerful
hold on American thinking about free speech precisely because it is per-
fectly logical. If we are convinced that a message is evil, and if we have no
doubt of our premises, then the bad tendency of the message strikes us as
worthy of condemnation and strikes us even more as worthy of being
banned by the law.
When I look at the forces on many public and private university cam-
puses that seek to ban hate speech today, I see proponents of the early
Holmes. Consider all who sought to prohibit the racial supremacist views
of Nazis and alt-right members from marching on the University of Vir-
ginia campus or the streets of Charlottesville in the long, hot summer of
2017. The enemies of the alt-right, I am sure, have no doubt of their
premises. And it is difficult to see why they should; the supremacist and
anti-Semitic views of Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich caused millions
to die in the Holocaust. The racism of the Ku Klux Klan fueled a reign of
terror in America, a contagion of lynchings and bombings.
In my judgment, the logic of the early Holmes position was embraced
and restated with elegance by Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, writing for a unanimous Court:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting”
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.176
This passage from Chaplinsky captures the essence of the early
Holmes.177 If we are convinced that neo-Nazis who advocate a white
ethno-state in America are an affront to order and morality and that their
message offers no plausible purchase as a step to truth, then why
shouldn’t we adopt the “perfectly logical” step of banishing such speech
from society?
The views of the early Holmes, as reinforced by decisions such as
Chaplinsky, largely dominated American free speech law for decades,
well into the 1950s. The Supreme Court’s decision in Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois178 is the most resonant exemplar. Joseph Beauharnais was an Illinois
racist, the leader of a Chicago racial supremacist group that called itself
the White Circle League of America. Beauharnais distributed leaflets in
Chicago bearing the headline: “PRESERVE AND PROTECT WHITE
176. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–73 (1942).
177. See Rabban, supra note 117, at 1277 (“Holmes’s decisions in Schenck, Frohwerk,
and Debs demonstrate his continued deference to majority will and to the external stan-
dards of liability that he believed necessary to enforce it.”).
178. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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NEIGHBORHOODS!”179 The leaflets declared that white neighbor-
hoods needed protection from “the constant and continuous invasion,
harassment and encroachment by the negroes.”180 Beauharnais called for
one million white people in the city of Chicago to oppose the national
campaign by President Harry Truman’s “Infamous Civil Rights Pro-
gram.”181 Beauharnais warned, “If persuasion and the need to prevent
the white race from becoming mongrelized by the Negroes will not unite
us then the aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana
of the negro, surely will.”182
Beauharnais was convicted of violating an Illinois law prohibiting hate
speech.183 The law made it a crime to publish “any lithograph, moving
picture, play, drama or sketch” which “portrays depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed
or religion” or which “exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or
religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of
breach of the peace or riots.”184
Justice Felix Frankfurter, who was Jewish, plainly had in mind Hitler’s
Holocaust and the use of group libel against Jews when he wrote the
opinion affirming Beauharnais’s conviction, referring to the “the tragic
experience of the last three decades.”185 But “Illinois did not have to look
beyond her own borders,” Justice Frankfurter observed, “to conclude that
willful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups pro-
mote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments re-
quired for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community.”186
Illinois had its own long history of racist violence. In 1837, Elijah Parish
Lovejoy, an abolitionist Presbyterian minister, journalist, and newspaper
editor, was brutally murdered by a pro-slavery mob in downstate Alton,
Illinois, in an attack on a warehouse to destroy Lovejoy’s printing press
and abolitionist publications.187 In 1951 there were riots in Cicero, Illi-
nois, a suburb just west of Chicago.188 (Cicero would again be the center
of violent racial tensions when Martin Luther King Jr. marched there,
bringing the civil rights movement to the North.)
Echoing the reasoning of Justice Murphy in Chaplinsky, Justice Frank-
furter concluded,
In the face of this history and its frequent obligato of extreme racial
and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say that the
179. People v. Beauharnais, 97 N.E.2d 343, 345 (Ill. 1951).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (alteration in original).
183. Id. at 344.
184. Id.
185. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258 (1952).
186. Id. at 258–59.
187. Elijah Parish Lovejoy, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www
.britannica.com/biography/Elijah-P-Lovejoy [https://perma.cc/NJQ8-AAYT].
188. Race Riots, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHICAGO, http://encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/
pages/1032.html [https://perma.cc/F7H6-6278] (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
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Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking ways to curb false
or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in pub-
lic places and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional im-
pact on those to whom it was presented.189
Social scientists might debate whether an individual’s sense of dignity
and self-worth is diminished by attacks on the individual’s racial or relig-
ious group, Justice Frankfurter argued, but the Illinois legislature was en-
titled to adopt the view that it was. It would “be arrant dogmatism, quite
outside the scope of our authority in passing on the powers of a State,” he
concluded, “for us to deny that the Illinois Legislature may warrantably
believe that a man’s job and his educational opportunities and the dignity
accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and
religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits.”190
I have personally invested a large part of my professional career as an
advocate for the later Holmes, and against the views of the early Holmes
and decisions such as Chaplinsky and Beauharnais. The briefs I wrote and
my oral argument in the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black191 rested
entirely on the shoulders of the Holmes dissent in Abrams and the later
Supreme Court decisions that would ultimately embrace it.
But as Holmes himself admonished, “certitude is not the test of cer-
tainty.”192 I have not been willing to join the chorus of voices claiming
that many in the current generation of college students “do not under-
stand free speech.” I put the matter more modestly. Many simply em-
brace a different conception of free speech—a conception more like the
early Holmes, more like the views of Justice Murphy in Chaplinsky or
Justice Frankfurter in Beauharnais.
In the end, both viewpoints may claim constancy with the biblical in-
junction that “ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.”
One side, confident in its premises, is willing to fight evil with law, a pro-
position “perfectly logical.”193 The other side is equally confident in its
faith “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”194 The clash
between the two views has long been part of the American democratic
experiment—as Holmes would say, “as all life is an experiment.”195
189. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 261.
190. Id. at 263.
191. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
192. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918).
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